摘 要:从股权分置改革开始，我国现代企业所有权和经营权的分离促进了企业的快速发展和进步，但与此同时，也带来了企业所有者和经营者之间的委托代理问题。那么，我们要如何解决企业的委托代理问题？目前，已经有相当多的国内外学者对高管持股进行了大量的研究，发现通过高管持股方式可以在一定程度上减少委托代理所产生的问题，但是高管持股还是会带来其他负面效应，比如，高管通过增减持本公司的股票来谋取私人收益。而现有研究文献大部分只研究了高管持股带来的正负效应，但没有对高管增减持股票过程中的市场反应、是否存在盈余管理行为等问题进行深入、系统的研究。
本文首先运用委托代理理论、信号传递理论和信息不对称理论等对我国上市公司高管增减持股票行为进行理论分析，在此基础上，以2006年至2011年间高管增减持股票的上市公司为研究样本，建立数理计量模型对高管增减持股票过程中的市场反应及是否存在盈余管理行为进行系统研究，力图从经验数据角度揭示我国上市公司高管增减持股票行为和盈余管理之间的关系。研究结果发现：高管增持公司的累计超常收益率在增持公告日前为负数，而高管减持公司的累计超常收益率在减持公告日前为正数；高管增持上市公司存在提前披露坏消息或延迟披露好消息的偏好，而高管减持上市公司则相反；高管在增持股票过程中存在负向盈余管理行为，而在减持股票过程中存在正向盈余管理行为。希望本研究结果能够为证券监管机构加强对上市公司高管增减持股票行为的监督和保护股东及其他利益相关者提供决策参考依据。
关键词：高管增减持；盈余管理；监管
ABSTRACT:From the share reform on, theseparation between ownership and management of China's modern enterprises promoted the rapid development and progress of enterprises, but at the same time, it also brought the principal-agent problem between owners and operators. So, how can we solve the principal-agent problem? At present, there have been quite a number of domestic and foreign scholars have conducted a lot of research on the executive holding stock problem, and found that senior managers stocks’ holding can solve consignment-agent problem, but senior managers stocks’ holding also lead to some negative effects. Existing literature mainly studies the economic consequences of managerial ownership, but the study on the market effects and the economic consequences between managerial holding stocks’ change and earnings management is not very rich.
This paper used agency theory, signaling theory and asymmetric information theory to theoretically analyze senior managers’ adding or reducing holding stocks behavior, and and established three econometric models to study the relationship between senior managers’ adding or reducing holding stocks and earnings management and its economic consequences through descriptive statistical analysis and empirical analysis. The article also established econometric models to systematically study senior managers’ adding or reducing holding stocks, earnings management and its economic consequences through empirical analysis with Listed Companies’ data as samples during year 2006 to 2011. The conclusions are the following: the stock cumulative abnormal returns of executive’ adding stock holdings listed companies were negative before the announcement, but executive’ reducing stick holdings listed companies had positive stock cumulative abnormal returns significantly before the announcement.Executives’ adding stock holdings listed companies tended to disclose bad news early, or delayed disclosure of good news, and executives’ adding stock holdings listed companies on the contrary. There were negative earnings management behaviors in the process of executives’ adding stock holdings,but positive earnings management behaviors in the process of executives’ reducing stock holdings. We hope that this study can provide references for the securities regulatory authority to strengthened supervise listed companies executives’ behavior and protect other stakeholders.
Keywords: Executives’ adding or reducing stock holdings; earnings management; supervision
