摘要：随着股份公司的产生，贝利（Bailey）和米恩斯（Means)在1932年出版的《现代公司与私有产权》一书中，对美国200家大公司进行了分析，发现大公司中相当比例的是由并未握有公司股权的高级管理人员控制。从而得出结论：现代公司已经发生了“所有与控制的分离”。企业的股东与经营者形成了委托--代理关系。为了解决委托--代理关系中股东和经营者之间的利益冲突问题，对经营者进行有效的监督和控制，股权激励这一长期激励方式应运而生。近年来，股权激励计划得到越来越多公司的追捧，它可以有效地减少激励对象的短视行为，使经营者更多地关注企业的长期利益。本文首先阐述论文研究的现实意义，介绍股权激励的理论基础，再以“伊利集团”股权激励方案为案例，通过分析伊利集团05年到12年的相关财务数据，找出伊利股权激励措施方案存在的缺陷和需要改进的地方。最后结合相关数据和理论提出改进股权激励的措施。
关键词：委托代理 股权激励 伊利集团
Abstract: As the shares of the company to produce,Bailey and Means in 1932 published " Modern Corporation and Private Property ," a book on U.S. 200 large companies were analyzed and found that a significant proportion of large companies by not holding there are equity firm controlled by senior management. With the separation of modern company,corporate shareholders and managers formed a principal - agent relationship.In order to solve the principal - agent relationship conflicts and to carry out effective supervision ,the long-term equity incentive emerged. In recent years,the equity incentive plan sought after more and more companies,which can effectively reduce the short-sighted incentive target,leaving operators to pay more attention to the long-term interests of the enterprise.This paper first describes the real significance of the research,describes the theoretical basis of incentive stock options.Then make YiLi Group equity incentive plan as the case,then through the analysis of financial data of YiLi Group in 2006 to 2012 to identify deficiencies and areas for improvement.Finally giving suggestions related to equity incentive according to the data and theory.
Keywords: Equity incentive principal-agent relationship YILI group
